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Abstract 
We analyze the determinants of caesarean sections and the role regional policies and institutions can play in 
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policies and institutions do matter. In particular, our results suggest that decentralized DRG tariffs might be an 
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president are important. 
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1. Introduction 
The expected growth in public health expenditure is a relevant policy issue in almost all 
developed countries. Not surprisingly, improving spending efficiency while guaranteeing (or 
even enhancing) citizens’ health is becoming a key challenge for policy-makers. A common 
suggestion coming from the policy-oriented literature is to foster service appropriateness: 
delivering appropriate services would produce cost savings, while contemporaneously ensuring at 
least the same level of citizens’ health (e.g., OECD, 2004). The incidence of caesarean sections 
on total childbirths is an indicator of inappropriateness commonly considered in the literature, 
and by policy-makers (see, e.g., OECD, 2009; for Italy, the indicators regularly published by the 
Italian Health Ministry in its annual report on hospital production, and Fortino et al., 2002). 
Being a surgical treatment, a caesarean section is characterised by a large cost (and risk) 
differential with respect to the alternative classical vaginal delivery (a medical treatment). Absent 
any clinically necessary reasons which justify the use of a caesarean section, vaginal delivery is 
generally considered an appropriate (and less risky) way of childbirth, which can clearly help in 
containing health care costs1. 
However, despite these considerations, an upward trend in the incidence of caesarean 
deliveries is a well documented stylised fact at the international level, which is intrinsically 
connected with the rise of medical intervention in childbirth in many nations (e.g., Johanson et 
al., 2002). The main explanations for this increasing tendency proposed by the literature focus 
mostly on microeconomic issues, which have been analyzed by considering patient-level data, 
leaving the relation between inappropriateness and spending at the aggregate level substantially 
unexplored. In particular, the literature claims a role for: technological changes improving the 
potential quality of maternity care (for instance, the possibilities to treat pain during labour, or the 
electronic foetal monitoring techniques); changes in patients’ characteristics (for example, the 
increase of the age of the mother at her first delivery); physicians and providers behaviours 
(clearly influenced by the payment system, but also by the fear of litigation). 
Considering the aggregate level, Italy represents an interesting case study. First, at the 
national level, caesarean section rate has more than trebled from 1980 to 2007, from about 10 to 
about 40 per cent, taking Italy well above the OECD average. Unsurprisingly, the necessity to 
monitor its dynamics has drawn the attention of national policymakers. The 2003-2005 National 
                                               
1 As we discuss below in more details, the presence of elevated risks to child or mother health is a primary reason for a 
caesarean section to be an appropriate treatment. The evaluation of such risks heavily relies upon the quality of prenatal 
and maternity care. Good quality can bring to early detections of complications during birth (changes in foetal heart rates, 
breached birth, amniotic fluid, blood pressure and oxygen changes), hence allowing for more appropriate caesarean 
sections. On the contrary, a poor prenatal and maternity care, combined with a overly interventionist medical management, 
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Health Plan defined by the Italian government stated the objective of containing the average share 
of caesarean deliveries at about 20 per cent by the end of the planning period.2 Over those years, 
however, the increasing trend in the incidence of caesarean births did not stop. Second, almost all 
childbirths are managed within the National Health Service, in a public or private hospital 
working for the NHS. Hence, the choice of vaginal versus caesarean delivery is basically a 
medical decision, influenced – beyond the patient conditions – by many organizational variables 
affecting providers’ behaviour. Third, regional variations both in the growth rate and the 
incidence rate of caesarean deliveries are significant (cf. infra par. 4.3). As regions represent in 
Italy the level of government in charge of providing and funding (at least partially) health care 
services, the observed variations in caesarean section rates  could be explained, at least in part, by 
different management practices across regional governments. For instance, caesarean deliveries 
are above 50 per cent and 60 per cent in Sicily and Campania respectively, two regions 
characterised by relatively high deficits, and where the room for cost savings is estimated to be 
large (e.g., Piacenza and Turati, 2014). These savings are likely to be obtained – without reducing 
or limiting the quantity or the quality of health care services – by improving appropriateness, 
which has been shown to be strongly correlated with the expenditure differentials observed across 
regions (e.g., Francese and Romanelli, 2013). 
This paper addresses the issue of which factors drive the observed regional variations in 
inappropriateness, providing an analysis of the determinants of caesarean section rates in Italy. In 
particular, we study the impact of both organizational variables affecting providers’ behaviour 
and the characteristics of regional governments on “unwarranted” caesarean sections, i.e., those 
sections that cannot be explained by legitimate causes, such as a risk to child or mother health. To 
do so, we follow the approach by Baicker et al. (2006), and try to separate “appropriate” 
caesarean sections from “inappropriate” ones, controlling for structural aggregate indicators 
linked to clinical factors, like the (average) mother’s age at delivery and the rate of neonatal 
mortality, that could make a caesarean section needed from a medical point of view. We then 
disentangle the impact of three groups of variables on “unwarranted” sections: 1) supply structure 
indicators, to take into account the role of different organisational arrangements of the hospital 
network, and the ability of different groups of producers to influence regional governments; 2) 
pricing policies indicators, such as the setting of DRG fees, to capture the role played by hospital 
reimbursement mechanisms; 3) political economy variables, catching some distinguishing 
                                                                                                                                                        
can rise the number of inappropriate caesarean sections, increasing both the risks for mother and child, as well as 
inefficient spending. 
2 In particular, the Plan included among its objectives the decrease of the frequency of caesarean deliveries and the 
reduction of the regional differentials (p. 82). The stated goal was to achieve – by the end of the three years period – a 
national average equal to 20 per cent, in line with the average values for other European countries. The reduction was to be 
obtained also through a revision of the DRG reimbursement fees. 
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features of regional governments, such as the political alignment with the central government and 
the composition of health care funding in terms of decentralized own resources and transfers from 
the central government. Indeed, given a national regulatory framework constitutionally defined, 
health policies in Italy are implemented and managed by regions in a way that reflects a complex 
net of intergovernmental relationships between the central and the regional governments. And the 
modern fiscal federalism theory suggests that the way in which different layers of government 
interact affects policy outcomes.  
Consistently with Baicker et al. (2006), our results suggest that “appropriate” caesarean 
sections only partly explain regional variation in caesarean deliveries. The “unwarranted” 
residual variation appears to be related to policy choices and political economy variables: the 
pricing policy, the weight of different types of producers (public versus private), and the “quality” 
of regional governments are all related to inefficient spending, as proxied by caesarean sections. 
The paper is linked to two different strands of literature. First, by taking an aggregate 
approach, it adds to patient level studies on the determinants of caesarean deliveries (see, e.g., 
recent examples of different approaches in Maso et al., 2013a; Maso et al., 2013b; Bragg et al. 
2010; Dranove and Watanabe, 2010; Ecker and Frigoletto, 2007; Fantini et al., 2006; Baicker et 
al., 2006; Johanson et al., 2006). Second, proposing an analysis at the regional level, the present 
work is also related to papers on regional variations in health care and in medical practice (e.g., 
Skinner, 2012, and Chandra et al., 2012 for recent surveys). In both cases, it emphasises the 
importance of the policies and the characteristics of local governments in a regional health care 
system as drivers of the observed variability in caesarean section rates. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of 
the available literature on caesarean sections. Section 3 sets the stage, giving essential 
background information on the Italian case. The empirical strategy and the data are presented in 
Section 4, while the econometric results are discussed in Section 5. A brief section of concluding 
remarks follows.  
2. Why are caesarean sections on the rise? A brief survey 
According to recent statistics provided in the OECD Health Data (2011), caesarean deliveries 
have increased at an annual growth rate of 3.2 per cent among the OECD countries during the 
2000-09 decade, reaching an average of 25.8 per cent per 100 live births in 2009. Brazil and 
China are the two countries recording the highest use of caesarean sections, with about half of the 
total deliveries. Among Western countries, Italy, the USA, and Germany are all well above the 
OECD average, with 38.4 per cent, 32.3 per cent and 30.3 per cent of caesarean sections per 100 
live births, respectively. Given this evolution over time, it is not surprising that the impact of 
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caesarean sections on maternal and perinatal health has drawn the attention of international 
organisations and national policymakers (see, e.g., Lumbiganon et al., 2010 on the 2007-08 
WHO global survey), as well as of academics. 
Economists have been concentrated on identifying the drivers of the observed upward 
trend mainly taking a microeconomic approach. According to this view, many factors can help 
explaining the increase in the incidence of caesarean deliveries (e.g., Ecker and Frigoletto, 2007). 
These factors can be grouped under three main categories. 
1. Technological changes in deliveries: these include, for instance, the shift from home to 
hospital delivery, the use of anaesthesia and newly improved anaesthetic techniques, the 
introduction of modern antibiotics, together with the creation of blood banks, neonatal intensive 
care units, techniques for monitoring the foetus health during pregnancy and labour, and also for 
inducing labour. All these factors work in the direction of making caesarean sections less risky 
with respect to the past, but also implies an increasing “medicalization” of childbirth, which has 
moved the act of giving birth from a normal physiological process to a medical one, heavily 
involving obstetricians (e.g., Johanson et al., 2002). 
2. Changes in patients’ preferences and characteristics: patients might be willing nowadays to 
accept a lower risk of an adverse outcome to avoid a caesarean delivery. The way in which they 
balance and assess risk associated with the different delivery procedures could have changed also. 
This might reflect both social and cultural factors, as well as modifications in reproductive 
behaviour. In this respect, notice that the age of the mother at her first delivery has significantly 
increased with respect to the past, and also parents educational levels and employment statuses 
(particularly for mothers) have experienced dramatic variations. For instance, in Italy the average 
age of the mother has increased from 27.5 in 1980 to 31.6 in 2008, the share of women with 
tertiary education has almost trebled (from 4.9 per cent in 1993 to 12.8 in 2007), and female 
labour force participation has increased from 41.9 per cent in 1993 to 51.6 in 2008. Furthermore, 
fertility rates and households’ size and composition are now significantly different than just a few 
decades ago. Again, taking Italy as an example, the total fertility rate has dropped from 1684 per 
thousand in 1980 to 1396.4 in 2009. The average size of the family has shrunken by 0.3 members 
per household (to 2.47 members) between 1994 and 2009, while the share of one-member 
households has increased from 21.14 per cent to 28.09 over the same period. All these factors 
make today (and probably more so in the future) vaginal delivery less preferred than caesarean 
delivery. Besides preferences, however, risk factors influence the need for caesarean deliveries. 
For instance, obesity, chronic hypertension, gestational diabetes are all clinical conditions used in 
the medical literature to adjust observed caesarean sections for risk, and to define the quality of 
obstetric care (see, e.g., recent works by Maso et al., 2013a; Maso et al., 2013b; Fantini et al., 
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2006; Bragg et al. 2010 ). All these factors have deteriorated in recent decades. This is the case, 
for instance, of the rise in overweight and obesity, which represent one of the major health 
concerns in almost all countries (OECD Health Data, 2011). 
3. Changes in physicians’ and providers’ behaviour: also the organisational characteristics of 
the health sector and medical best practices have displayed large changes over the last decades. 
Such changes are often linked to technological progress, and bring back the “medicalization” of 
childbirth mentioned above. However, changes in physicians’ and providers’ behaviours may be 
induced by changes in other variables. An example are the incentive effects of the payment 
system: if the level of the tariff relative to the costs is higher for a caesarean section than for a 
vaginal delivery, there is a clear incentive to supply the former instead of the latter for hospitals 
that can retain the difference. Hence, the organization of the health care system, the tasks 
assigned to public and private providers, as well as the role of regulation are all important 
elements which need to be taken into account when evaluating the impact of a change in the 
reimbursement mechanism. A second example is the change in physicians’ preferences for 
leisure, which may reflect the more intense use of induced labours, and the scheduling of 
deliveries to suit providers’ timetables, in particular physicians’ and obstetricians’ work shifts. 
For instance, Brown (1996) examines the impact of physicians’ demand for leisure on caesarean 
section rates, observing that the probability of a caesarean delivery over the weekend and at 
certain hours of the day (and night) is significantly different (lower) than that for vaginal births. 
An additional issue that has received attention in the literature is the increasing fear of 
malpractice lawsuits, which might have influenced physicians’ decisions in promoting caesarean 
sections (e.g., Localio et al., 1993; Dubay et al., 1999; Baicker et al., 2006; Johanson et al., 2006; 
Dranove and Watanabe, 2010). However, more recent results seem to suggest that the impact of 
litigation is small and short lived (Dranove and Watanabe, 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, the incentive role of the payment mechanism has drawn most of the 
economists’ attention. Gruber and Owings (1996) investigate the impact of the exogenous shock 
induced on physicians’ incomes by the drop in fertility on the providers’ decisions to substitute a 
cheaper treatment (the vaginal delivery) with one characterised by a higher reimbursement (the 
caesarean delivery). Such a reaction would be consistent with a model of induced demand (see, 
e.g., McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Chandra et al., 2012). Considering US data, the authors find a 
positive relation between the fall in fertility and the incidence of caesarean births, even though 
the impact is small (about 1/6 of the total change in the caesaren section rate). This incentive 
effect of fee differentials has been confirmed by other studies. Gruber et al. (1999) find that 
differences in tariffs have a positive effect on the probability of caesarean delivery for Medicaid 
enrolees. In particular, they estimate that the larger differentials for patients that are privately 
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insured with respect to Medicaid enrolees accounts for between ½ and ¾ of the differential in the 
rate of caesarean births in the two groups. Grant (2009), replicating the analysis by Gruber et al. 
(1999), estimates a much lower impact of the tariffs (about ¼ of the one reported originally), the 
difference being mainly due to sample selection and the adopted estimation procedure. According 
to Grant’s analysis, other factors account for most of the difference observed between the two 
populations, in particular risk factors and non-random matching between privately insured 
patients and providers which are more inclined to resort to caesarean deliveries (Grant, 2005). 
3. Setting the stage: Italy as a case study 
In this paper we concentrate on Italy, a country where the rate of caesarean deliveries is well 
above the OECD average, and where there is significant regional heterogeneity, which may also 
be driven by institutional aspects, since the regional governments are in charge of managing 
health care services. Before moving to the analysis of the factors that can play a role in the use of 
the caesarean delivery as opposed to the traditional vaginal delivery, we briefly describe the 
general institutional characteristics of the Italian health care system. According to OECD Health 
Data (2011), per capita total spending was 3,137 USD in Italy in 2009, slightly below the OECD 
average. The system is mostly public: ¾ of total spending is covered by the Italian NHS, a public 
universalistic scheme – established in 1978 – to provide all citizens a large common set of 
essential health care services throughout the country; the remaining ¼ is private spending, mostly 
out-of-pocket, which basically covers purchases of drugs and private specialists care. One of the 
main characteristics of the Italian NHS is the decentralisation of spending policies. The NHS 
involves different layers of governments, originating a complex net of intergovernmental 
relationships (see, e.g., France et al., 2005; Turati, 2013). In particular, while funding of the NHS 
is (mostly) in the hand of the central government – despite some recent moves towards a higher 
degree of fiscal decentralisation – the management of the services is devolved at the regional 
level. Management of the services includes, for instance, decisions on the organisation of the 
hospital network (including the authorisation to supply for private providers), the staffing of 
public hospitals, as well as the definition of a whole set of region-specific tariffs within the 
nationally defined DRG-based Prospective Payment System. All these policies are affected by the 
characteristics of regional governments: health spending is the main task assigned to regions, 
absorbing about 80 per cent of their budgets. Especially after the electoral reform of the mid 
Nineties, a relevant role in steering the decision and in the management process is played by the 
regional government’s president. The president is directly elected by citizens every five years, 
together with the members of the Regional Council, and has the power to appoint regional 
councillors on various policy areas, including health care management. Furthermore, the 
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president can serve for an unlimited number of terms3; hence, health care policies with a sensitive 
social impact (like the decision to rationalise the hospital network) are likely to affect the 
probability of re-election. 
Decentralisation clearly marks the differences across regions also in the supply of hospital 
services, which include the two types of delivery. A national reform implemented at the 
beginning of the Nineties tried to replicate the quasi-markets framework of the UK experience, 
separating the public purchasers of the services from their public providers, and allowing for 
some competition from private hospitals. As for public producers, the reform was fully 
implemented only in one region, Lombardy, while it has been only partially realised in the 
remaining ones, where (at least some) public hospitals are still owned by the public insurers (e.g., 
Turati, 2013; Brenna, 2011). The definition of both the tariffs and of the role to be assigned to 
private hospitals (via the authorisation process) has also been different across regional 
governments. As for the tariffs, not all regions decided to implement their own set of prices, but 
simply adopted those defined at the national level (e.g., Cantù et al., 2011). As for the role 
assigned to private producers, this varies widely across regions as a result of different 
authorisation policies, and a different view of regional governments with respect to the potential 
benefits of competition (e.g., Pelliccia and Trimaglio, 2009). Considering official data provided 
by the Ministry of Health for 2010, the share of beds in private authorised hospitals is about 19 
per cent on average in Italy, but this reaches 33 per cent in Calabria and 31 per cent in Campania, 
while it is about only 2 per cent in Liguria. Within this framework, each patient is obviously free 
to choose the (public or private) hospital which will provide the treatment without having to pay 
for the service received. The hospital (whatever the ownership, public or private) will then be 
directly reimbursed by the competent regional government. 
In terms of maternity care, according to the latest report by the Ministry of Health 
(Ministero della Salute, 2013), almost all deliveries are financed by the NHS, via the supply of 
free hospital services (by both public and private authorised hospitals). The few privately paid 
deliveries are either supplied by private hospitals outside the NHS, or are home births (which, 
differently from other countries like the Netherlands, represent only 0.1 per cent of total 
deliveries). The NHS also offers pre-birth diagnostic visits, but access to services is influenced by 
education and by income, with more educated and rich women often substituting publicly 
supplied services with private care paid out-of-pocket. Within the NHS, the use of caesarean 
sections is higher for private hospitals than for public ones (58.3 per cent of total deliveries 
versus 34.6 per cent). Notice that private providers have an obvious financial incentive in 
preferring caesarean deliveries, since DRG tariffs are generally higher for caesarean sections than 
                                               
3 In 2004 a limit has been introduced to the number of consecutive terms which cannot be higher than two. 
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for vaginal deliveries4. Data also show a clear gradient with respect to the total number of 
deliveries at each hospital: the choice of caesarean sections is higher in hospitals where the 
number of deliveries is lower, reaching 64 per cent of total deliveries in private authorised 
hospitals managing less than 500 deliveries per year. 
The caesarean section is of course needed in the presence of clinical reasons. The 
variables that have been identified as risk factors in the choice of a caesarean delivery by the 
medical literature based on Italian microdata (e.g., Maso et al., 2013a; Maso et al., 2013b; Fantini 
et al., 2006) include both foetus characteristics (like malposition/malpresentation and weight), 
and mother characteristics (like ante-partum haemorrhage, APH, umbilical cord prolapse, UCP, 
but also age, past experience of a caesarean section, and lifestyle habits). However, the literature 
makes clear that, even controlling for these risk factors, differences across hospitals still persist. 
As observed by Maso et al. (2013b), this means that there are variations in clinical evaluation and 
management of risk factors in deliveries. These variations might be related either to differences 
across care givers (for instance, different physicians might evaluate dystocia in different ways), 
or to differences in hospital practices and organization. While the study is limited to one small 
autonomous region in the North-Eastern part of the country (Friuli Venezia Giulia), it can be 
assumed – considering for instance studies discussed in Chandra et al. (2012) – that variability 
across regions is also related to variability in care givers behaviour and organization. 
Behaviour and organization of hospitals is certainly linked to the characteristics of 
regional governments and their policy choices, for example in terms of tariffs and the size of 
hospital network. But despite the relevance of caesarean sections, contrary to the USA, economic 
studies on Italy are quite rare. Pizzo (2008) highlights a significant difference in the national 
reimbursement fee between vaginal and caesarean delivery in the Italian DRG payment system, 
but she does not provide any estimate of the impact of fee differentials on the probability to 
observe a caesarean birth. After noting the wide regional variation in caesarean delivery rates, 
Pizzo attempts at assessing the potential savings that would have been observed had the caesarean 
section rate been fixed to a given reference value (like, e.g., the one proposed by the WHO). 
Savings are shown to be substantial (about 10 per cent of total expenditure for deliveries). Fabbri 
and Monfardini (2008) consider the issue of assortative matching between mothers and two types 
of providers, public and private hospitals, with the latter being characterised by a higher 
(unconditional) inclination to resort to a caesarean section. According to the authors’ findings, the 
assortative matching between patients and providers is of minor relevance: the selection 
mechanism of patients into hospitals is largely driven by risk factors, with the more risky patients 
                                               
4 According to recent data made available by the Ministry of Health, considering national DRG tariffs used for 
compensating mobility of patients across regions, the difference is more than 1 thousand euro, being the tariff for caesarean 
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being admitted into public hospitals, which can be considered of higher quality with respect to 
private providers, since the latter often do not have emergency surgical capacities or intensive 
care units. Indeed, after controlling for selection and other observable characteristics, the 
conditional probability of resorting to a caesarean delivery is still higher in private hospitals than 
in public ones. A finding that leaves the issue concerning the effects of financial incentives open. 
In what follows we provide a first attempt to fill the gap, by providing a regional level evaluation 
of the importance of financial incentives, the supply structure, and – more generally – the 
“quality” of regional governments in charge of managing health care policies for explaining the 
rapid increase observed in caesarean deliveries. 
4. The empirical strategy 
4.1. Model specification 
To test the impact of different groups of variables on the caesarean section rates, we consider the 
following multivariate specification: 
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where the dependent variable ity  is the (ln of the) odds ratio of caesarean deliveries in region i in 
year t. In the light of the previous discussion, covariates are grouped into four categories: 
[a] control variables jitx  (j = 1, …, J), such as demographic characteristics of patients (e.g., 
mothers’ age) and their education, and other factors to capture the riskiness of births. These 
variables should proxy both the patients’ preferences and the clinical risk factors which 
make caesarean deliveries necessary. In this sense, they are meant as proxying for a 
predicted probability of caesarean sections, in the attempt of separating “appropriate” 
sections from “inappropriate” ones5; 
[b] supply indicators fitw  (f = 1, …, F), such as the workforce composition and the incidence of 
private providers, in order to control for organisational and structural differences which 
could influence physicians’ choices; 
                                                                                                                                                        
sections € 2457.72, and the one for standard vaginal delivery € 1318.64. 
5 The concept of “appropriateness” is defined according to Baicker et al. (2006) and should be interpreted as “medical 
appropriateness”. At the aggregate regional level, this means that we are identifying a number of births that «are 
collectively viewed by doctors as being better candidates for a caesarean» (again, Baicker et al., 2006). This is of course an 
approximation and a clear limitation of the present study. As discussed in the medical literature, the recourse to a caesarean 
section can be made necessary by clinical conditions arising during labour. For instance, Lieberman and O’Donoghue 
(2002), in their review of studies on the unintended effects of epidural analgesia, suggest that the use of epidural is 
associated with a lower rate of spontaneous vaginal delivery, particularly in nulliparous women, which might originate the 
need for a caesarean section. 
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[c]  pricing policy indicators kitk  (k = 1, …, K), in particular the presence of a region-specific 
complete set of DRG fees for the reimbursement of hospital services; 
[d] political economy indicators hitz  (h = 1, …, H), such as the political orientation of the 
regional government with respect to the central one, the importance of decentralized own 
revenues to finance current health spending, and the years of experience of the regional 
president. All these variables should capture the influence of regional governments’ 
institutional features on caesarean section rates and health care inappropriateness; 
[e] we also include regional ( ia ) and year (dt ) dummies in order to control for space and time 
fixed effects, respectively.  
Statistical inference from the model presented in Equation (1) can be influenced by two different 
sources of bias: spatial correlation, due to the presence of possible strategic behaviours among 
regions driven by geographical proximity, and serial correlation, due to the clear upward trend 
characterising the growth of caesarean rates. We take into account both these issues when 
estimating our model (see Section 5.1 below for a discussion).  
4.2. Data and variables 
Equation (1) is estimated on the sample of all Italian regions over the years 1998-20056. We 
consider both Ordinary and Special Statute regions, including the two Autonomous Provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano, for a total of 21 units observed for 8 years. Descriptive statistics for all the 
variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in Table 1. 
Control factors are drawn from the Health for All dataset provided by Istat (the National 
Institute of Statistics), and are all available at the regional level. They include: an indicator for 
mother’s age, defined as the average age of the mother when giving birth; the birth rate, i.e., the 
number of childbirths per 1,000 people; the share of women with only primary school education; 
the neonatal mortality, i.e., the number of deaths within the first 6 days of life per 10,000 live-
born babies, which is meant to proxy for other clinical risks that can influence the need for 
caesarean delivery.7 
                                               
6 The sample period starts in 1998 since the DRG prospective payment system has been introduced and the tariffs decided 
at national level in 1997. In this way, the comparison of performances in caesarean deliveries across regions is carried out 
under a common national regulatory framework for the reimbursement of hospital costs, which allows to better identifying 
the role played by differences in regional policies (notice that extending the analysis to include the year 1997 delivers 
results in line with those discussed below). Moreover, the years considered here are those for which the information is 
available for all the variables included in the estimated models. 
7 As mentioned in Section 3, the medical literature based on patient level data (for sub-samples of the Italian population) 
suggests that many factors are linked to increased use of caesarean deliveries, such as particular clinical conditions that 
may happen during the pregnancy (cord prolapse, malpresentation, etc.), maternal comorbidities (as diabetes, heart 
diseases, etc.), and lifestyle habits (such as smoking or being overweight); see, for example, Stivanello et al. (2013) and 
Maso et al. (2013a,b). However, detailed data (or indicators) for these factors at aggregate regional level are not fully 
available. Therefore, it is not possible to pursue the strategy of including all these controls. Moreover it should be noted 
that the inclusion of a comprehensive set of risk indicators is less relevant in an aggregate framework than in a micro-
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics: sample of all Italian regions over the years 1998-2005 
# obs   mean  std. dev.   min   max
% caesarean deliveries 168 33.154 9.470 14.120 59.950
dependent variable ln odds ratio of caesarean deliveries 168 -0.730 0.430 -1.805 0.403
mother's age 168 30.737 0.727 28.600 32.060
birth rate 168 9.178 1.183 6.900 12.230
% primary school education (females) 168 17.718 3.210 10.083 25.133
neonatal mortality (first 6 days) 168 10.905 4.755 0.000 25.580
medical staff (% of total NHS employees) 168 54.723 3.237 47.031 59.612
beds in private hospitals (ratio) 168 11.749 8.439 0.000 35.051
pricing policy 
indicators (k )
regional tariffs (dummy) 168 0.292 0.456 0.000 1.000
in line with central government (dummy) 168 0.494 0.501 0.000 1.000
share of own funding 168 0.367 0.149 0.065 0.728
president gender (dummy) 168 0.958 0.200 0.000 1.000
president experience 168 3.280 3.145 0.000 15.000
president is a doctor (dummy) 168 0.089 0.286 0.000 1.000
control  variables (x )
supply  indicators (w )
political economy 
indicators (z )
 
Sources: dependent variable, controls and supply indicators are drawn from Istat – Health for All, and from publications by the 
Italian Health Ministry; pricing policy variables are built from information drawn from Agenas and Carbone et al. (2006); political 
economy variables are computed from data published by the Italian Ministry for Domestic Affairs.  
 
Supply indicators for the structural characteristics of the hospital sector are published by 
the Italian Health Ministry. We consider two variables here: the share of beds in private hospitals 
out of the total regional supply of beds, to control for the “preference” of private hospitals for 
caesarean sections with respect to vaginal deliveries; and the relative size of the medical staff 
(including both physicians and nurses), as a percentage of the total number of employees in the 
regional health service (the remaining employees being mainly managers, administrative staff and 
other technical positions), to capture potential effects of demand induction8 and, more generally, 
the impact of organisational choices on the outcome of the services. 
As for the pricing policy adopted in each region for hospital services, we build different 
variables starting from available information provided by the Agenzia Nazionale per i Servizi 
                                                                                                                                                        
oriented analysis: over a relatively short time span (as the 8-year period considered in our analysis) it is likely that the 
geographical distribution of risk factors remains substantially stable, so that any residual riskiness (besides that captured by 
the age of the mother and neonatal mortality rate) is absorbed by fixed effects and time dummies. Such conclusion is 
supported by data published by Agenas in the framework of the Programma Nazionale Valutazione Esiti (PNE), which are 
referred to primary caesarean rates. The database reports raw and risk adjusted caesarean rates for (almost) all the (public 
and private) hospitals that work with the NHS. The data are however available only for the years 2007-2012, and do not 
overlap with our sample period (so that we cannot use risk adjusted caesarean rates as a dependent variable). However, 
they show that the degree of correlation in each year between the regional distribution of raw and risk adjusted rates is very 
high (between 0.96 and 0.98), suggesting that the remaining bias in our dependent variable is not so severe as one might 
think, since we control for one of the main demographic factor for riskiness (the age of the mother) and neonatal mortality.  
8 An additional factor which can influence demand induction is the fear of lawsuits. We are unable to control for regional 
differences in malpractice and related consequences. Notice, however, that Italian legislation assigns to Regions also the 
choice of whether to cover the risk (at least partly) with a public fund, or to buy coverage on the insurance market. Our 
fixed-effects specification should then help capture also this factor, which is however found to exert a small and short-lived 
impact in the literature (Dranove and Watanabe, 2010). 
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Sanitari Regionali (Agenas, literally the National Agency for Regional Health Services) and the 
reconstruction presented in Carbone et al. (2006). In particular, we consider a dummy variable 
equal to one when regional governments set their own complete set of DRG tariffs different from 
the national standards as established by the decree DM 30.06.1997.9 We expect governments that 
implemented a system of region-specific tariffs to be more active in the management of health 
care services, hence more attentive in expenditure control and in reducing “unwarranted” 
caesarean sections. As the new tariffs can require some time to be effective, we also define a 
dummy picking up the year in which each regional government has introduced its own DRG fees 
(if they have decided to do so). We finally interacted these two variables with the share of beds in 
private hospitals, expecting a different impact of pricing policies according to the relevance of 
private producers. In particular, we expect that – where the share of private providers is 
substantial – these can try to lobby regional governments to obtain a more profitable tariff 
regulation, which may turn into a higher degree of inappropriateness in spending. 
Political economy indicators are built upon information published by the Italian Ministry 
for Domestic Affairs, or directly requested to regional administrative offices. These include two 
variables capturing characteristics of regional governments that reflect their relationships both 
with the central government and the citizens-voters, which have been interpreted in the literature 
as important factors influencing efforts by sub-national governments in controlling decentralized 
expenditure and inefficiencies (e.g., Arulampalan et al., 2009; Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Boetti 
et al., 2012; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). As for the relationship with the central government, we 
look at the political alignment between central and regional government, by building a dummy 
equal to one when the political orientation of the two levels of government is the same. As 
governments in Special Statute regions are formed by local autonomist parties, we checked the 
political alignment for each of these by considering affiliations at the central level. We classified 
as left (right) oriented the autonomist parties forming majorities at the central level with left 
(right) wing parties. According to the available literature, the alignment between central 
government and regional government can result either in a virtuous “help out” effect – according 
to which politically aligned regions cooperate with central government in controlling health 
expenditure and deficit – or in an opposite “bailout expectation” effect – according to which the 
regions hope to receive a more benevolent treatment in terms of ex-post funding by a ‘friendly’ 
central government than by an adversary one.10 As for the relationship with citizens-voters, we 
consider a variable measuring the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), defined as the ratio 
                                               
9 One could also have considered the relative tariff of caesarean sections with respect to vaginal delivery for each region 
and each year of the sample. Unfortunately, these data are not available at the Agenas, and Regional governments are not 
keen at providing such information, so that we were able to collect only very partial information that can not be exploited 
in our estimations. 
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between regional own funding and public health expenditure. Regional own revenues follow the 
classification proposed by the Ministry of the Economy in the Relazione Generale sulla 
Situazione Economica del Paese (General Report on the Economic Situation of the Country), and 
include mostly regional taxes like the Irap (i.e., a regional tax on productive activities), and the 
regional surcharge on Irpef (the Italian personal income tax). According to modern fiscal 
federalism theory (e.g., Qian and Weingast, 1997; Weingast 2009), focusing on the incentives 
towards electoral accountability of government officials and identifying fiscal decentralization as 
a disciplining device for local politicians, we expect that the lower the share of decentralized own 
resources, the higher the degree of VFI, the lower the electoral accountability of regional 
government, hence the higher the inappropriateness of public health spending. 
Given the prominence of the governor in policy making for health care, we also enrich the 
analysis of the role played by political institutions by defining three variables capturing important 
features of the regional government’ president: the gender (a dummy equal to zero in case the 
president is a woman), to control for the specific care women may have for the issues related to 
health care in general, and for delivery in particular (see, e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004); 
the experience (a variable measuring the number of years the president has been in office), 
expecting a more experienced governor to be more able to effectively control spending, in the light 
of the issue of management capacity building (see, e.g., Honadle and Howitt, 1986); the 
occupation (a dummy equal to one in case the president is a physician), to control both for the 
particular attention a doctor can have for health care in general, and for the technical knowledge 
he might exploit in favouring different types of deliveries and in managing regional health care 
services. 
4.3. Preliminary evidence on caesarean deliveries in Italy 
With respect to trends registered at the international level, the increase in the share of caesarean 
deliveries in Italy has been remarkable: on average, at the national level the caesarean section rate 
increased from 12 per cent in 1980 to 37 in 2007 (from 29 to 37 per cent in the sub-sample period 
1998-2005 considered in this paper; see footnote 6). However, its dynamics showed significant 
regional variations. After a period of convergence in the eighties, since the nineties developments 
have been differentiated across regions. In particular the coefficient of variation has increased 
from 0.19 in 1991 to 0.28 in 2007 (0.28 is also the average coefficient of variation observed in 
our sub-sample). These developments have shown a clear geographical pattern (Fig. 1, panels a, b 
and c). The regions in the North and Centre were characterised by significantly lower growth 
rates in the use of caesarean sections than those experienced in the South. 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 For further discussion on this issue see, in particular, Arulampalan et al. (2009) and Bordignon and Turati (2009).  
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Figure 1. Caesarean deliveries in the Italian regions normalised with respect to national average 
a) North b) Centre
c) South and Islands
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Sources: our computations on Istat, Health for All. 
 
 
Of course, unconditional means might simply reflect different changes in regional 
populations. A first glance at the data shows that the more frequent use of caesarean sections was 
in fact accompanied by changes in patients’ characteristics across regions and time. For instance, 
the correlation between the incidence of caesarean births and the number of patients with 
complications at delivery is positive. The same is true if one considers mother’s age, which rose 
considerably over the last decades in almost all regions. But the impact of changes in patients’ 
characteristics is different in the different areas of the country (Fig. 2).11 A simple OLS regression 
of the incidence of caesarean deliveries on mother’s age shows a positive relation between the 
                                               
11 Figure 2 presents a scatter plot analysis of the incidence of caesarean sections and the average mother’s age in each 
region (independently of the year to which the data refer). It shows that higher mother’s age is generally associated to a 
more frequent use of caesarean deliveries. 
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two variables, which at least partly reflects a time trend in the age of the mothers in all the areas 
of the country. However, it also highlights a statistically significant difference in the coefficient 
between the South (for which the estimated coefficient is higher) and the rest of the country, 
while differences between the regions in the North and the Centre are not statistically significant. 
The different reaction to patients’ characteristics across regions raises the question of what other 
institutional or policy determinants can account for such evidence, which is the focus of the 
paper. 
 
Figure 2. Incidence of caesarean sections and mother age by macro area 
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5. Estimation results 
5.1. Methodological issues: serial and spatial correlation 
As a baseline approach, we estimate Equation (1) using a panel fixed-effect estimator. We 
performed a Hausman test comparing fixed and random-effect estimators; the results suggest the 
use of the former. Table 2 compares estimation results for a baseline model including structural 
controls only (column A) with those obtained from augmented specifications adding the other 
three groups of variables listed above (columns B-E). In general, the sign of the coefficients and 
their significance levels are quite robust across model specifications. Region-specific fixed 
effects are significant: the geographical pattern confirms the descriptive evidence discussed 
above, with Northern regions displaying, ceteris paribus, a lower odds ratio. 
We tested the adopted specification and estimation strategy in several ways. In particular, 
we controlled for two kinds of problems: serial and spatial correlation. Concerning serial 
correlation, we performed two tests. While the Wooldridge (2002) statistics does not reject the 
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hypothesis of no serial correlation, the Bargava et al. (1982) modified DW suggests the presence 
of serial correlation. Therefore, for all estimated specifications robust standard errors (clustered 
by regions) are provided. Furthermore, we extended the model to include time lagged regressors, 
to check for the presence of a dynamic dimension of the model which could be due to time 
persistence in agents’ behaviour. However, none of these additional regressors turned out to be 
significant, so that we consider a static model.  
As for the issue of spatial correlation, we recognize that in a decentralised setting – such 
as regional governments in Italy – the economic policies of neighbouring jurisdictions may show 
a certain degree of correlation, as highlighted by several empirical studies in many different 
countries (e.g. Brueckner, 2003). Interactions among regional governments can be the result of a 
political strategy. From a theoretical point of view, assuming the presence of private information 
about either the quality of the incumbents or the costs and benefits of the policies implemented 
(e.g., Salmon, 1987, Besley and Case, 1995), citizens can get some insights by comparing the 
performance of their politicians with the performance of politicians in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
As a consequence, when making their choices, incumbent governments would have an incentive 
to consider the policies in neighbouring jurisdictions – especially those related to sectors with a 
clear impact on citizens’ wellbeing, such as health care – in order to maintain political consensus.  
To account for these potential effects, we estimated a spatial panel fixed effects model 
(Table 2 – column F) that allows to test both for spatial lag and spatial error correlation (Anselin, 
1988). The analysis considers the complete set of covariates included in the model in Table 2, 
col. E (including time dummies). The weighting matrix was computed on the basis of the 
Euclidean distances between the capitals of the regions12; we considered a row standardised 
version of the matrix. Tests for spatial correlation suggest that the hypothesis of the absence of 
spatial correlation in the error term cannot be rejected, while they indicate that negative lagged 
spatial correlation is statistically significant.13 This implies that higher caesarean section rates in 
neighbouring regions are associated with lower rates in the region under consideration. There are 
at least two possible explanations for this negative sign: on the one hand, considering the need for 
caesarean sections, a negative spatial lag might be related to high risk patients’ mobility, since 
highly specialised paediatric hospitals recognized by the Ministry of Health are located in just 
                                               
12 Distances have been calculated using the Google maps distance calculator. This tool measures distances “as the crow 
flies”. 
13 Tests also suggest that the absence of additionally lagged spatial correlation both in the dependent variable and in the 
error term cannot be rejected. To verify the results offered by the spatial fixed effect model we also proceeded to separately 
estimate a lag and error version of the model using standard spatial estimators and including regional and time dummies in 
all the specifications. Such additional analysis also suggests that spatial correlation in the error term is not a significant 
issue.  
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half of the twenty regions.14 On the other hand, considering “unwarranted” caesareans, a negative 
spatial lag could be the sign of caesarean deliveries being a strategic substitute in regional 
governments’ policies: for a given rate in neighbouring regions, there is an incentive for regional 
governments to reduce their use in order to signal to their citizens their commitment toward 
spending efficiency. Overall, however, the spatial model confirms the magnitude, sign and 
significance of the coefficients obtained in the full baseline regression (column E). Table 3 
reports estimated coefficient of the spatial panel fixed effect model; since the dependent variable 
is the (log of the) odds ratio of the caesarean deliveries, the table also presents the transformed 
coefficients in terms of (more easy to read) percentages of caesarean deliveries. Given the adopted 
specification and the estimation results, total marginal effects for the spatial model can also be 
computed. They confirm the sign and magnitude of the effects of the variables of interest provided 
by the baseline model.15 Table 4 displays summarising results – total, direct and feedback 
(stemming from the spatial lag dynamics described above) marginal effects – that have been 
computed as averages (over the regions) of the marginal effects on the dependent variable in 
region i with respect to variable r in the same region.16  
On the basis of this set of estimates, we can therefore proceed with the discussions of the 
main results concerning the role played by the different factors determining the choice of 
caesarean deliveries.  
5.2. The determinants of caesarean sections rates 
Considering control variables first, we find that – as expected – the effect of mother’s age is 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that older mothers at time of giving birth are 
associated with a higher (and, probably, “medically appropriate”) number of caesarean sections. 
On the contrary, the impact of the birth rate is negative and significant. This result is in line with 
the findings in Gruber and Owings (1996), suggesting that a drop in fertility is accompanied by 
an increase in caesarean sections. The interpretation proposed by the authors – reflecting the US 
experience – is that a decline in hospital revenues (due to the reduced number of births) triggers a 
substitution between vaginal births (reimbursed at a cheaper rate) and caesarean births (which are 
paid at a higher tariff). However, another possible explanation for the negative impact of the birth 
rate on caesarean deliveries, especially in a mostly public health care system like the Italian one, 
may be the presence of a “learning effect”, i.e., the greater experience gained by the hospitals 
                                               
14 These include almost all the regions in the North; Lazio, Toscana and Marche in Central Italy; Campania in the South; 
and both the Islands, Sicily and Sardinia. 
15 The spatial model is presented in the Appendix, which also describes how marginal effects and elasticities can be derived 
from the specified model. Tables with detailed results for some of the variables of interests are also provided in the 
Appendix. The full set of marginal effects and elasticities can be provided upon request.  
16 The detailed description of the total, direct and feedback marginal effects is included in the Appendix. 
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when the number of births increases, which should imply a reduced need for caesarean sections. 
This second interpretation is in line with the available descriptive evidence, that shows an higher 
use of caesarean deliveries the lower the number of births in a hospital (Ministero della Salute, 
2013). We also take into account a measure of the underlying riskiness of births, which could be 
a factor of a more intense use of “appropriate” caesarean sections. In particular, following Gruber 
and Owings (1996), we include as a regressor the neonatal mortality rate within 6 days.17 The 
estimated coefficient for neonatal mortality is indeed positive, suggesting that caesarean sections 
increase with riskiness.18 Finally, we control for the education level of (potential) mothers, by 
considering the share of females holding only a primary school diploma (thus picking up the 
share of women with a very low level of education, those probably more prone to decisions taken 
by physicians). The estimated coefficient is positive, but significant only in the spatial fixed 
effect model. Therefore, in general, differences in average education do not significantly affect 
the use of caesareans. However, the positive sign suggests that, ceteris paribus, women with only 
elementary schooling display a higher use of caesarean sections, hence they are likely to be more 
inclined to incentives affecting providers’ behaviour and influencing variations in medical 
practice (e.g., Chandra et al., 2012). 
As for supply indicators, the incidence of medical staff on the total number of employees 
positively affects the number of caesareans. Also the coefficient for the share of beds in private 
hospitals is positive, but never statistically significant.19 There are two explanations for these 
findings: first, supply indicators are in general quite “sticky” over time, particularly so over a 
short time span like the 8 years used in our study; hence, their effect is picked up by regional 
fixed effects. Furthermore, these variables refer to the generality of health services, and are not 
specific to gynaecology/obstetrics wards. They are meant to reflect overall management and 
policies in the health care sector, in line with the objective of considering the incidence of 
                                               
17 The neonatal mortality rate is defined as the fraction of live births that die within 6 days. Our results are however 
confirmed also using the neonatal mortality rate at 29 days. Notice that neonatal mortality could be influenced by the 
choice of caesarean sections: on the one hand, an “appropriate” use of caesarean sections could reduce mortality; on the 
other hand, a poor quality of prenatal care could increase mortality, not making use of a caesarean section when needed. To 
check the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity problem, we have also run the specifications reported in 
Table 2 columns A-E using lagged values of this indicator. All our results (coefficients and significance levels) remains 
substantially unaltered with respect to those reported in Table 2, and lagged neonatal mortality turned out to be never 
significant. 
18 As for the underlying riskiness of delivering, in order to partially control for the factors highlighted by the medical 
literature (see Section 3 and footnote 7), and to further test the robustness of our specification, we have also estimated 
extended models which include additional control variables. In particular, we considered two indicators built upon 
information on the main comorbidities and/or lifestyle factors at regional level for the female population. Coefficients 
estimated for the new indicators were never significant, while the others were substantially unaffected (in sign, magnitude 
and significance), thus suggesting that the baseline specification adopted here satisfactorily takes into account birth 
riskiness. 
19 We also controlled for a measure of use intensity of hospitals facilities (average stay in hospital). The variable is not 
significant and affects neither the magnitude nor the significance of the other coefficients. Similarly, including the ratio of 
beds on population (as a measure of productive capacity) yields a non significant coefficient and does not alter the other 
findings. 
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caesarean sections a proxy for the extent of inappropriateness/inefficiencies in the provision of 
health services in each region.  
Looking at pricing policy indicators, the dummy variable accounting for the presence of 
regional own tariffs has a negative impact on the number of caesarean deliveries (columns C-F; 
total marginal effect for the spatial fixed effect model is reported in Table 4). Our interpretation 
for this result is that regions adopting a whole set of region-specific DRG tariffs are putting effort 
in managing health expenditure using available policy tools. When interacting the dummy for the 
presence of regional DRG tariffs with the relative size of the private hospital sector, we find a 
positive coefficient for the interaction term, implying that the reducing effect on caesarean 
sections stemming from the active management of reimbursement tariffs is mitigated (or even 
reversed) the higher the relevance of private hospitals (Fig. 3).20 A likely interpretation is that, 
where the share of private providers is particularly large, lobbying efforts by these providers 
aimed at obtaining more favourable tariffs offset the efforts of regional governments in defining a 
pricing policy aimed at controlling inappropriateness and spending inefficiencies. We also find a 
positive impact for the dummy variable accounting for the introduction of regional tariffs (which 
takes on value 1 only the year DRG tariffs were adopted), which would suggest the possible 
presence of some “adjustment costs”. Similarly, its interaction with the share of beds in private 
hospitals – included to capture the incentives of these providers to reduce “adjustment costs”, in 
order to exploit more rapidly the benefits associated with the new tariffs – shows a negative and 
significant coefficient.  
An important issue that is worth discussing here concerns whether these estimated effects 
represent causal relationships, i.e., our pricing policy indicators may be interpreted as actual 
determinants of the variability observed in caesarean rates. Indeed, it may be that decentralized 
DRG fees are put in place by regions as a consequence of high levels of inappropriate spending 
so as to reduce it, which would make these variables endogenous (e.g., Dafny, 2005).21 Although 
we recognize the potential importance of this problem, there are at least three arguments 
supporting the view that our pricing policy indicators are reasonably exogenous. First, even 
though in general we agree that defining regional fees can also aim at improving the 
appropriateness in health care services (e.g., Cantù et al., 2011; Morandi et al., 2008), our 
dependent variable refers to a particular treatment – birth delivery using a caesarean section – 
which, even if assumed to be a proxy for spending appropriateness, it is unlikely to be the only 
factor affecting the decision to introduce region-specific DRG fees for the whole set of health 
                                               
20 For example the estimates for specification E in Tab. 2 imply that when the share of beds in private hospitals is larger 
than 17 per cent the introduction of regional tariffs does result, all other things being equal, in an increase in the odds ratio 
of caesarean deliveries.  
21 We acknowledge an anonymous referee for raising this issue.   
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care services.22 Second, while the regions can introduce own DRG tariffs to make the price 
system closer to their actual costs and local specificities, there is usually a certain lag (two years 
or more) between the collection of production data and the year in which they are used to set 
prices (e.g., Fattore and Torbica, 2006, for Italy; Januleviciute et al., 2012, for Norway). Finally, 
there are other important decisions taken by regional government concerning the health care 
policy – e.g., the overall organisational arrangement of hospitals, the introduction of expenditure 
caps, ceilings and targets, the definition of services to be financed through lump sum transfers – 
which exhibit different features across regions and affect the adoption of a specific tariff system 
besides the role played by actual costs.23 All in all, relying on the above arguments, variations 
observed in pricing policies across regions can be therefore considered to be pre-determined and 
the estimated effects of region-specific DRG fees discussed above interpreted as causal 
relationships.  
 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the results on regional DRG tariffs (Table 2 – column E) 
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22 Indeed, as remarked in Morandi et al. (2008), in order to provide the correct incentives to improve appropriateness, the 
regional tariffs should be defined so as to reflect production costs and in accordance with the perceived need of increasing 
or reducing the provision of each health treatment, thus resulting in deviations (upward or downward) from national DRG 
fees differentiated across services. It is worth noticing that a similar argument supporting the exogeneity of our regressors 
with respect to caesarean rates applies also when considering potential endogeneity problems for supply indicators – see 
the above discussion about the share of beds in private hospitals and its dependence on the generality of health care 
services – and, a fortiori, for political economy factors, as regional governments’ and presidents’ characteristics possibly 
reflect overall management and policies related to many other services besides health care.           
23 See, e.g., Cantù et al., 2011; Finocchiaro Castro et al., 2014. In particular, these authors have pointed out that, while in 
Northern and Central regions DRG fees are consistently used to provide cost incentives to producers, in Southern regions 
such a role is weakened by the coexistence with other funding criteria such as past and current expenditure and deficits. 
These differences across regions are captured by regional fixed effects. 
 23
Finally, considering the role played by political economy factors (columns D-F), we find 
that some characteristics of regional governments do indeed matter. We look first at the effects of 
the two variables capturing the relationships with the central government and the citizens-voters. 
While the political alignment per se appears to have no influence on caesarean sections (even if, 
as discussed below, it has a significant impact when considered together with the president’s 
experience), the coefficient for the share of own regional resources on total health spending 
shows a negative sign and it is statistically significant: the lower the degree of VFI, the lower the 
share of caesarean sections, hence the inappropriateness of health care services. As the 
institutional rules governing own resources in Special Statute regions are different from those in 
Ordinary Statute ones, we also interact our proxy for VFI with a dummy identifying Special 
Statute regions. However, coefficient for this interaction term turns out to be neither statistically 
significant nor altering the magnitude of the other coefficients, probably because of the presence 
of regional fixed-effects already accounting for differences in the institutional framework. This 
inappropriateness-reducing effect is consistent with two different interpretations. First, in line 
with modern theories of fiscal federalism (e.g., Weingast, 2009), a higher degree of fiscal 
autonomy determines higher electoral accountability, leading to a tighter control on government 
spending and increased cost efficiency. From this perspective, our result adds to recent empirical 
literature investigating how tax decentralization and VFI affect local government size using a 
different indicators of inefficient spending (e.g. Jin and Zou, 2002; Borge and Rattsø, 2008; 
Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2011; Boetti et al., 2012; Liberati and Sacchi, 2013). Second, regional 
differences in the share of decentralized funding mostly reflect tax base distribution across the 
country (e.g., De Matteis and Messina, 2010), and might then capture North-South inequalities in 
per capita GDP, which impact indirectly on the use of caesarean sections via patients’ 
preferences, beyond our control for mothers’ education.24  
As for the individual features of the regional governor, we find that the coefficient for 
president’s experience (measured by the number of years the president has been in office) is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a more experienced president helps 
containing the caesarean section rate, which is one indicator along which the Ministry of Health 
monitors the performance of regional governments. This positive impact of experience on 
performance is probably due to the ability of a more experienced governor to make policy 
choices to work effectively. For instance, more experience can facilitate a regional monitoring 
                                               
24 One could argue that the variability in VFI may also pick up differences in health care needs across regions, which result 
in changes in health expenditure for a given level of own resources. To this regard, the analysis of health spending of the 
Italian regions over the period 1993-2006 carried out in Piacenza and Turati (2014) pointed out that the increase in health 
needs is associated with a lower spending inefficiency, thus implying that the resources seem to be better allocated in 
regions where illnesses are particularly difficult to treat. This evidence corroborates our interpretation of a lower VFI as a 
factor associated to a reduction in health care inappropriateness.  
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activity on hospitals’ behaviour, or the bargaining process with hospitals’ manager in the case of 
decisions affecting the hospital network. The result is in line with recent findings of the literature 
on electoral discipline of the duration of legislative terms, which points out that longer terms tend 
to improve the performance of governments (e.g., Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011). However, when 
interacting the president’s experience with the dummy capturing the political alignment between 
regional and central government, we find a positive and significant coefficient. Hence, the 
positive effect stemming from experience vanishes in the case of presidents politically aligned 
with the central government. As discussed, e.g., by Arulampalan et al. (2009), this finding can be 
interpreted in terms of increased president’s expectations of a more “benevolent” treatment (for 
instance, in terms of deficit bailout) by a friendly central government than by an adversary one. 
We also control for the type of presidents’ occupation before entering politics, defining a dummy 
equal to 1 when the president is a physician. Coefficient for this variable is positive and 
statistically significant. One possible interpretation is that physicians are likely to be more 
sensitive to lobbying from the health care sector, and implement a weaker regulation; in turn, this 
is reflected in a higher level of inefficiency and inappropriateness. Additionally, governors from 
medical professions can simply decide to respect medical autonomy and medical influence on 
childbirth, increasing discretional choices by obstetricians and physicians. 
6. Concluding remarks 
A recurrent policy suggestion to control health spending growth while guaranteeing adequate 
level of services to citizens is to reduce inappropriateness. In this paper we exploit the rate of 
caesarean deliveries as a proxy for inappropriateness and the Italian regional health care system 
as a case study: on the one hand, there is evidence of large differences in the use of caesarean 
sections across different regional governments, those in charge of managing health care services 
in Italy. On the other hand, the literature emphasizes a positive link between inefficiency in the 
production of health services and inappropriateness of treatments, so that reducing inappropriate 
services would imply cost savings for the public purse. The problem is sizeable: recent controls 
on the information included in the patients’ discharge records conducted by the Italian Ministry 
of Health pointed out that 43 per cent of the caesarean sections executed in 2010 are likely to be 
unwarranted according to clinical conditions. Back-of-the-envelope calculations by the same 
Ministry of Health suggest that this percentage of inappropriateness would imply for the Italian 
NHS potential savings of about 80-85 million euro per year, about 10 per cent of the yearly 
expenditure for deliveries.25 Our aim is to study how inappropriateness is affected by variables 
                                               
25 The brief note with the results of these controls is available at the web site: 
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=914.  
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capturing both the policies implemented by regional governments (like the supply structure of 
hospital services, and the choice of region-specific tariffs), and the characteristics of regional 
governments (like their political alignment with the central government, and the experience of the 
region’s president). To this end, we try to separate “appropriate” treatments (taking into account 
control variables like the mother’s age and the riskiness of births, which should capture medical 
reasons to opt for a caesarean section), from “inappropriate” ones. 
Our estimates on the complete set of Italian regions over the years 1998-2005 suggest that 
these regional variables do indeed matter. As for regional policies, while we find no significant 
strong direct effects for supply indicators, our results imply that the adoption of a complete set of 
region-specific DRG tariffs could be an effective policy tool to control inappropriateness. 
However, decentralizing the choice of DRG tariffs, by allowing regional governments to 
differentiate their fees from national ones, does not guarantees superior outcomes per se, since a 
process of regulatory capture could be at work if private hospitals are strong enough. A particular 
attention to providers’ behavioural responses has thus to be paid by regional governments, as the 
weight of private providers with respect to total supply of hospital services can even revert the 
positive effects stemming from the introduction of region-specific pricing policies. 
As for the institutional characteristics of regional governments, confirming previous 
findings in fiscal federalism literature, our results suggest that having access to significant own 
revenues for funding health expenditure appears to provide the right incentives to regional 
governments to control inappropriateness, making them more accountable towards citizens-voters 
for the use of public resources. This suggests investigating effectiveness and viability of the 
policy option of asymmetric federalism, that is allowing spending autonomy only to those 
regional governments characterized by a low degree of VFI. Furthermore, a longer experience of 
the regional governor can play a positive role in building the necessary management capacity 
which allows setting (or at least replicating) the best practices in the sector. But this reducing 
effect on inappropriateness can be mitigated by the political alignment of regional governments 
with the central government, since politically aligned regions emerge as less able to control 
inappropriateness the longer the experience of their president. In this perspective, these results 
can raise some questions on the recent decision to introduce a limit in consecutive terms also for 
regional governors. 
While we did our best in the attempt to separate “appropriate” caesarean from 
“inappropriate” ones, controlling for variables capturing average patients’ characteristics and the 
riskiness of birth, our exercise could not consider a number of variables affecting differences in 
medical practice (for instance, in the evaluation of clinical parameters) or clinical conditions 
arising during labour, which can influence the need of a caesarean section. This represents a 
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limitation of the present study, that requires the use of micro-data to be (at least partially) solved, 
and indicates avenues for future research. 
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Table 2 – Equation (1): estimation results 
A B C D E
[a ] control mother's age 0.100 ** 0.119 *** 0.121 *** 0.127 *** 0.129 *** 0.140 ***
variables (x ) 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.039 0.035 0.037
birth rate -0.120 *** -0.112 *** -0.109 *** -0.085 *** -0.084 *** -0.102 ***
0.020 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.026
% primary school educ (females) 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.017 **
0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
neonatal mortality (first 6 days) 0.004 0.005 0.005 * 0.004 * 0.004 ** 0.003 **
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
medical staff (% of total NHS employees) 0.010 ** 0.010 * 0.008 0.003 0.012 *
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007
beds in private hospitals (ratio) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
regional tariffs (dummy) -0.180 *** -0.246 *** -0.260 *** -0.199 ***
0.063 0.066 0.080 0.072
introduction of regional tariffs 0.048 0.055 * 0.066 ** 0.076 ***
0.032 0.031 0.031 0.027
regional tariffs*(bed in private hospitals) 0.014 *** 0.017 *** 0.015 *** 0.013 ***
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
introduction of tariffs*(beds in private hospitals) -0.007 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 **
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
in line with central government 0.005 -0.013 -0.003 
0.014 0.016 0.017
share of own funding -0.466 * -0.435 * -0.504 ***
0.249 0.211 0.189
president gender -0.021 -0.031 
0.042 0.032
president experience -0.010 ** -0.009 ***
0.003 0.003
president experience*(in line with central govenrment) 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
0.002 0.002
president is a doctor 0.075 *** 0.073 ***
0.018 0.014
constant -2.800 ** -4.027 *** -4.080 ** -4.195 *** -4.012 *** -5.492 ***
1.195 1.405 1.466 1.393 1.267 1.633
# of observation 168 168 168 168 168 168
within R2 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.87
test for autocorrelation
Bhargava et al. DW 1.507
critical value 1.79
Wooldridge test 2.940
p-value 0.163
r  (lag spatial correlation) -1.332 **
Wald test (for r=0) 5.893
p-value 0.017
Spatial autocorrelation in the error (l=0)
Global Moran I -0.005 
p-value 0.969
LM test 0.014
p-value 0.905
Robust LM test 0.024
p-value 0.878
F - Spatial 
Panel Fixed 
effects#
§Panel fixed effect estimation; robust standard errors in italics; all regressions include year dummies and region fixed effects. Significance levels:
1% ***, 5% **, 10% *.
MODEL SPECIFICATION§
# Row standardised weights (distances) matrix.
Dep. variable: ln of odds ratio of caesarean
deliveries 
[b ] supply 
indicators (w )
[c ] pricing 
policy 
indicators (k )
[d ] political 
economy 
indicators (z )
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Table 3 – Estimated coefficients – Model F (Table 2) 
[a ] control mother's age 0.140 *** 3.076 ***
variables (x ) 0.037 0.803
birth rate -0.102 *** -2.246 ***
0.026 0.576
% primary school educ (females) 0.017 ** 0.371 **
0.008 0.180
neonatal mortality (first 6 days) 0.003 ** 0.076 **
0.002 0.035
medical staff (% of total NHS employees) 0.012 * 0.254 *
0.007 0.152
beds in private hospitals (ratio) 0.002 0.048
0.002 0.041
regional tariffs (dummy) -0.199 *** -4.362 ***
0.072 1.570
introduction of regional tariffs 0.076 *** 1.676 ***
0.027 0.602
regional tariffs*(bed in private hospitals) 0.013 *** 0.275 ***
0.004 0.093
introduction of tariffs*(beds in private hospitals) -0.006 ** -0.130 **
0.002 0.050
in line with central government -0.003 -0.073 
0.017 0.370
share of own funding -0.504 *** -11.061 ***
0.189 4.153
president gender -0.031 -0.677 
0.032 0.705
president experience -0.009 *** -0.196 ***
0.003 0.067
president experience*(in line with central govenrment) 0.008 *** 0.165 ***
0.002 0.045
president is a doctor 0.073 *** 1.603 ***
0.014 0.302
§Robust standard errors in italics - Significance levels: 1% ***, 5% **, 10% *.
# Impacts on the % of caesarean deliveries are given by ( d c/ d y)*( d y/ d x r )=( d c/ d y)* b .
[d ] political 
economy 
indicators (z )
Estimated coeff -  
dependent variable ln of 
odds ratio of  caesarean 
deliveries (b ) §
Dep. variable: ln of odds ratio of the incidence of caesarean deliveries
(y=ln(c/(1-c) )
[b ] supply 
indicators (w )
[c ] pricing 
policy 
indicators (k )
Transformed coefficients 
(direct effect on the 
incidence of caesarean 
deliveries: ( d c/ d y)* b ) 
§#
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Table 4 – Marginal effects§ – Model F (Table 2) 
 Dependent variable (ln of odds ratio of 
caesarean deliveries) 
  % of caesarean deliveries 
Total effect Direct effect 
Feedback 
effect  Total effect Direct effect Feedback effect 
    
rii bm  rb  ( ) rii bm 1-   ( ) riiii yc bmdd /  ( ) rii yc bdd /  ( )( ) riiii yc bmdd 1/ -  
[a] 
control 
variables 
(x) 
mother's age 0.152 0.140 0.012  3.336 3.076 0.260 
birth rate -0.111 -0.102 -0.009  -2.436 -2.246 -0.190 
% primary school educ (females) 0.018 0.017 0.001  0.403 0.371 0.031 
neonatal mortality (first 6 days) 0.004 0.003 0.000  0.082 0.076 0.006 
         
[b] supply 
indicators 
(w) 
medical staff (% of total NHS employees) 0.013 0.012 0.001  0.275 0.254 0.021 
beds in private hospitals (ratio) 0.002 0.002 0.000  0.052 0.048 0.004 
         
[c] 
pricing 
policy 
indicators 
(k) 
regional tariffs (dummy) -0.216 -0.199 -0.017  -4.730 -4.362 -0.368 
introduction of regional tariffs 0.083 0.076 0.006  1.818 1.676 0.142 
regional tariffs*(bed in private hospitals) 0.014 0.013 0.001  0.298 0.275 0.023 
introduction of tariffs*(beds in private hospitals) -0.006 -0.006 -0.001  -0.141 -0.130 -0.011 
         
[d] 
political 
economy 
indicators 
(z) 
in line with central government -0.004 -0.003 -0.000  -0.079 -0.073 -0.006 
share of own funding -0.547 -0.504 -0.043  -11.996 -11.061 -0.935 
president gender -0.033 -0.031 -0.003  -0.734 -0.677 -0.057 
president experience -0.010 -0.009 -0.001  -0.213 -0.196 -0.017 
president experience*(in line with central government) 0.008 0.008 0.001  0.179 0.165 0.014 
president is a doctor 0.079 0.073 0.006  1.739 1.603 0.135 
                  
§ Marginal effects reported in this table are computes as averages over the regions as for example: å
=
=
N
i
riirii
1
bmbm . 
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Appendix 
In order to test (and account) for the possible presence of spatial correlation, we estimate  a spatial 
model (with fixed effects) of the following type: 
ttttttt PPyXy nxlxxrb +=++=                                                                                               (2) 
where Xt  is the NxR matrix of our regressors (control, supply, pricing policy and political economy 
indicators), P the (NxN) weights matrix and nt the error term. N is the number of regions (equal to 
21) and R=J+F+K+H the number of regressors. The model allows in principle for the presence of 
both lag and error spatial correlation. 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as (omitting to report the time subscript for convenience): 
1][with           --=MM+M= PIXy rxb                  (3) 
or  
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where mij are the elements of matrix M. 
We can therefore obtain the following marginal effects and elasticities for the dependent variable in 
region i with respect to variable r in region j: 
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Given that the dependent variable is the (log of the) odds ratio of caesarean deliveries (ci), i.e.  
yi=ln(ci/(1-ci)), we can also get the marginal effects and elasticities for ci as follows: 
      and    ,
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We provide examples of the resulting marginal effects and elasticities. For regional tariffs, tables 5 
and 6 present marginal effects respectively in terms of the dependent variable and the incidence of 
caesarean deliveries; while tables 7 and 8 report elasticities (in terms of the dependent variable and 
the incidence of caesarean deliveries) for the share of own funding.26  
Given the estimated coefficients we can also obtain total, direct and feedback, marginal effects.27 
We compute them according to the following equations (where the upper-bar indicates averages 
over regions): 
 
                                               
26 Results related to all the regressors included in the empirical analysis are available upon request. 
27 For a more general discussion of marginal effects in spatial panel model see Elhorst (2012). 
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In this paper, the direct effect is captured by estimated coefficients (br). The total effect includes 
also the feedback (or spillover) effect induced by spatial correlations. Feedback effects arise 
because changes in variable r in region i affect also the outcomes in other regions, that in turn affect 
the outcome in region i (according to the weighting matrix P used in the estimation). The feedback 
effect therefore is computed taking into account such retroactions which are measured by iim , i.e. 
the average over regions of the mii elements of matrix M.  
Table 4 in the main text reports the results. The last three columns present the marginal effects on 
terms of the incidence of caesarean deliveries; they are computed at sample means of the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 5 – Marginal effects on dependent variable* ( )jri xy dd /  
Variable r: Regional tariff           332.1               199.0 -=-= rb r   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 -0.224 0.052 0.022 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.026 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
2 0.059 -0.220 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
3 0.021 0.017 -0.214 0.008 0.014 0.006 0.004 0.025 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
4 0.003 0.004 0.008 -0.230 0.078 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
5 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.071 -0.232 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
6 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.014 0.019 -0.214 0.026 0.004 0.019 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
7 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.033 -0.210 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
8 0.025 0.009 0.026 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.003 -0.213 0.011 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004
9 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.006 0.009 -0.215 0.035 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
10 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.036 -0.215 0.021 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
11 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.021 -0.214 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
12 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.027 -0.211 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
13 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.018 0.007 -0.214 0.035 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005
14 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.019 0.016 0.033 -0.216 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003
15 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.018 -0.217 0.038 0.011 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.003
16 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.010 0.040 -0.217 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.008 0.004
17 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.015 0.009 -0.214 0.044 0.014 0.005 0.003
18 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.038 -0.219 0.015 0.006 0.003
19 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.023 -0.208 0.019 0.006
20 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.020 -0.206 0.015
21 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.016 -0.204
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* Dep. variable y: ln of odds ratio of caesarean deliveries 
 
 
Table 6 – Marginal effects on % caesarean deliveries  ( ) ( )( )jriiijri xyycxc dddddd /// =  
Variable r: Regional tariff 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 -4.91 1.14 0.49 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.57 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06
2 1.28 -4.83 0.45 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
3 0.45 0.37 -4.70 0.19 0.31 0.14 0.08 0.56 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
4 0.07 0.10 0.18 -5.05 1.70 0.31 0.21 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
5 0.07 0.09 0.26 1.56 -5.10 0.40 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
6 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.43 -4.70 0.58 0.09 0.42 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
7 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.19 0.73 -4.60 0.08 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
8 0.55 0.20 0.58 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.07 -4.67 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08
9 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.39 0.14 0.21 -4.72 0.78 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
10 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.79 -4.71 0.46 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06
11 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.46 -4.70 0.53 0.36 0.41 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06
12 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.22 0.58 -4.63 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05
13 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.40 0.16 -4.69 0.78 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.11
14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.42 0.35 0.71 -4.74 0.37 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06
15 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.40 -4.77 0.83 0.24 0.37 0.09 0.08 0.06
16 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.23 0.88 -4.76 0.16 0.46 0.15 0.16 0.09
17 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.33 0.20 -4.70 0.97 0.30 0.11 0.06
18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.44 0.51 0.84 -4.80 0.33 0.14 0.06
19 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.51 -4.57 0.41 0.12
20 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.30 0.16 0.23 0.44 -4.53 0.33
21 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.36 -4.47
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Table 7 – Elasticity of dependent variable* at sample mean values ( )( )yxxy jri // dd  
Variable r: Share of own funding 730.0               367.0 -== yx   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 0.285 -0.066 -0.028 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.033 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
2 -0.075 0.280 -0.026 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
3 -0.026 -0.021 0.273 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008 -0.005 -0.032 -0.012 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
4 -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 0.294 -0.099 -0.018 -0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
5 -0.004 -0.005 -0.015 -0.091 0.296 -0.023 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
6 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.018 -0.025 0.273 -0.034 -0.005 -0.024 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
7 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.015 -0.011 -0.042 0.267 -0.005 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
8 -0.032 -0.012 -0.033 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.271 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005
9 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.022 -0.008 -0.012 0.274 -0.045 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
10 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012 -0.046 0.274 -0.027 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
11 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011 -0.027 0.273 -0.031 -0.021 -0.024 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
12 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.013 -0.004 -0.011 -0.013 -0.034 0.269 -0.009 -0.022 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
13 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.023 -0.009 0.272 -0.045 -0.012 -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007
14 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.025 -0.020 -0.042 0.275 -0.021 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
15 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.023 0.277 -0.048 -0.014 -0.022 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
16 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.013 -0.051 0.276 -0.009 -0.027 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005
17 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.019 -0.012 0.273 -0.057 -0.018 -0.006 -0.004
18 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.025 -0.030 -0.049 0.279 -0.019 -0.008 -0.004
19 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 -0.023 -0.030 0.265 -0.024 -0.007
20 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 -0.013 -0.026 0.263 -0.019
21 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.021 0.260
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* Dep. variable y: ln of odds ratio of caesarean deliveries 
 
Table 8 – Elasticity of % caesarean deliveries at sample mean values ( )( )cxxc jri // dd  
Variable r: Share of own funding 15.33               367.0 == cx   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 -0.138 0.032 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
2 0.036 -0.135 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
3 0.013 0.010 -0.132 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
4 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.142 0.048 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
5 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.044 -0.143 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
6 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.012 -0.132 0.016 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
7 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.020 -0.129 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
8 0.015 0.006 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.131 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
9 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.006 -0.132 0.022 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
10 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.022 -0.132 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
11 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.013 -0.132 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
12 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.016 -0.130 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
13 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.005 -0.132 0.022 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
14 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.020 -0.133 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
15 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.011 -0.134 0.023 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.002
16 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.025 -0.133 0.005 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.002
17 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.006 -0.132 0.027 0.009 0.003 0.002
18 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.014 0.024 -0.135 0.009 0.004 0.002
19 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.014 -0.128 0.011 0.003
20 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.012 -0.127 0.009
21 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.010 -0.126
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